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| First Decade Twenty Zeros Action Protest Violaters Of NPT Randy Frushour Brief 21st Century Counterculture Publishing |
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 NBC DateLine FeedBack"Veinte Ceros" Spanish For Twenty Zeros Topline HeadlineAt Its Very Core Christianity - Is A Counterculture Revolution Eighteen Examples of Double Meanings In The English LanguageYour help is important and appreciated. A suggested donation of Twenty Dollars per year per reader of the report is considered appropriate. See our address below. Please make at least a single donation to cover the cost of processing your name to the mailing list. You might like to use the safe & easy sevice of Tipjar on page. The "Name The Decade" 1999 Polls "First Decade" The Title "Twenty Zeros" Consider "Double Meanings" In The English LanguageFrom Gossip Columnist In L.A. Dear Randy, I tried getting into your document but could only get to first page, none of the highlighted subjects could be opened. Why don't you just briefly explain it to me. Thanks, Anita T. LA.Com WHOSE LAND IS THIS ANYWAY? The Dawes Act of 1887 47 Million Acres About 47 million acres of tribal land is now held in government trust, mostly in the Dakotas, Montana, New Mexico and Arizona.NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION Over the past 30 years the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success. It has involved cooperation in developing nuclear energy while ensuring that civil uranium, plutonium and associated plants are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely.North Korea & Iran - January 2004 NORTH KOREA In contrast, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) provides an example of safeguards succeeding in their aim of detecting a violation of safeguards obligations. It was subsequently brought to the attention of the international community through the UN Security Council. The DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the then USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992. During that period, in late 1985, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt at Yongbyon. It exhibited all the features of a plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes and produced only about 5 MWe. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe) at Yongbyon, and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe) at Taechon. In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant for the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT on some pretext and use the plutonium for weapons. One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear material in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared. This suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required under the IAEA's Statute) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites. In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA. Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor remained under close surveillance. Following bilateral negotiations between DPRK and the USA, and the conclusion of the agreed framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remained uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and did not comply with its safeguards agreement. Iraq was defeated in a war, which gave the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons program as part of the cease-fire conditions. The DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective, or risk provoking war. Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons program in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about $US5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced US design. there was also the prospect of diplomatic and economic relations with the USA. At the end of 1999 The long-awaited contract to build two 1000 MWe light-water reactors was signed, enabling construction to begin. The agreement is between KEDO, the international organisation in charge of the project, and the South Korean utility KEPCO, bringing technology to build a nuclear power plant which is not amenable to misuse. KEDO was set up following the 1994 deal involving the USA to head off the production of weapons plutonium from the small gas-graphite reactor and to provide much needed energy - in the short term fuel oil, but eventually electricity. The Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) reactors are the same as those currently being built in South Korea, and were expected to be completed in 2008. South Korea committed to provide US$ 3.22 billion for the US$ 4.6 billion project, with Japan contributing US$ 1 billion and the EU most of the balance. In August 2002, with the project running several years behind schedule due to North Korea's continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA in verifying the history of its nuclear program, first concrete for the two-unit nuclear power plant was poured at Kumho, on the northeast coast. This formal start of construction was a milestone for KEDO, which planned to deliver the main components in 2005. The work would then stop unless North Korea was fully compliant with IAEA requirements regarding verification of past activities (specifically, that all nuclear material held by North Korea has been declared and placed under safeguards). IRAN Iran attracted world attention in 2002 when previously undeclared nuclear facilities became the subject of IAEA inquiry. On investigation, the IAEA found inconsistencies in Iran's declarations to the Agency and has raised questions as to whether Iran is in violation of its safeguards agreement, as a signatory of the NPT. Iran joined the NPT in 1974 and in 1975-76 construction started on two 1293 MWe nuclear reactors comprising the Bushehr power station on the Persian Gulf. Siemens KWU was the contractor. After the Islamic revolution, payment was withheld and work was abandoned early in 1979 with unit 1 substantially complete. In 1994 Russia was brought in to complete unit 1 as a VVER-1000 reactor. This necessitated major changes, including fabrication of all the reactor components in Russia under a construction contract with Atomstroyexport. The reactor is due to start up in 2004. All fuel for the life of the reactor will be supplied from Russia, and it is intended that spent fuel will be returned there, obviating the need for any fuel cycle facilities in Iran. All work has been under IAEA safeguards and operation will also be under safeguards. The Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran has announced that construction of unit 2 is to proceed and that feasibility studies for a further 5000 MWe have been ordered. In 2000 Iran declared its intention to build a uranium conversion plant at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre. At the same time it started building at Natanz a sophisticated enrichment plant, which it declared to IAEA after it was identified in 2002 by a dissident group. Since then traces of highly-enriched uranium have been found at another facility connected with Natanz, the Kalaye Electric Co in Tehran. These traces are centralto questions about Iran's compliance with its safeguards agreement. In 1991 Iran imported 1.8 tonnes of natural uranium from China. Iran did not declare this material however until 2002, and not all of it has been accounted for. Some was converted to metallic form - not required for any part of Iran's declared program. The country has very small uranium reserves, apparently insufficient for any nuclear power program. Iran has a 5 MW pool-type research reactor in Tehran. It is also developing a 40 MW heavy water-moderated "research" reactor at Arak fuelled by natural uranium. The IR-40 design is very similar to those used by India and Israel to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Construction is planned for 2004, and Iran has said that it will be under IAEA safeguards. A heavy water production plant is already under construction at Arak. A fuel manufacturing plant is being constructed at Esfahan from 2003, its stated purpose being to serve the IR-40 reactor and Bushehr. All the above facilities, except the Kalaye plant and the Arak heavy water plant, are under IAEA safeguards as of mid 2003. Details are in the Director-General's report to the IAEA Board: GOV/2003/40 of 6 June and 9 September 2003, on IAEA web site. See also Iran section of IAEA web site. As an expression of international concern about all these facilities apart from Bushehr, the IAEA gave Iran until the end of October 2003 to resolve outstanding questions about them and its materials. In "a welcome and positive development", Iran then formally told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it would accept the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with IAEA, and that it would suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in Iran, specifically those at Natanz. The IAEA will now need to verify the implementation of these decisions. An IAEA report released to its member states on 10 November showed that Iran has, in a series of contraventions of its safeguards agreement over 22 years, systematically concealed its development of key techniques which are capable of use for nuclear weapons. In particular, that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation from spent fuel were carried out on a laboratory scale. Iran has admitted to the activities but says they are trivial. The report says that to date no evidence of a weapons program has been found, but that it will take some time before the IAEA will be able to conclude that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Iran situation has revived wider concerns about which countries should develop facilities with high proliferation significance - such as enrichment and reprocessing, even under safeguards if there is no evident economic rationale. At some point in the future, such a country could give three months notice of withdrawal from the NPT and reconfigure its facilities for weapons production. The USA asserts that Iran has been in fact developing just such a breakout capability. |
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